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Abstract
Background: School closure was employed as a non-pharmaceutical intervention against pandemic 2009 H1N1,
particularly during the first wave. More than 700 schools in the United States were closed. However, closure
decisions reflected significant variation in rationales, decision triggers, and authority for closure. This variability
presents the opportunity for improved efficiency and decision-making.
Methods: We identified media reports relating to school closure as a response to 2009 H1N1 by monitoring high-
profile sources and searching Lexis-Nexis and Google news alerts, and reviewed reports for key themes. News
stories were supplemented by observing conference calls and meetings with health department and school
officials, and by discussions with decision-makers and community members.
Results: There was significant variation in the stated goal of closure decision, including limiting community spread
of the virus, protecting particularly vulnerable students, and responding to staff shortages or student absenteeism.
Because the goal of closure is relevant to its timing, nature, and duration, unclear rationales for closure can
challenge its effectiveness. There was also significant variation in the decision-making authority to close schools in
different jurisdictions, which, in some instances, was reflected in open disagreement between school and public
health officials. Finally, decision-makers did not appear to expect the level of scientific uncertainty encountered
early in the pandemic, and they often expressed significant frustration over changing CDC guidance.
Conclusions: The use of school closure as a public health response to epidemic disease can be improved by
ensuring that officials clarify the goals of closure and tailor closure decisions to those goals. Additionally, authority
to close schools should be clarified in advance, and decision-makers should expect to encounter uncertainty
disease emergencies unfold and plan accordingly.
Background
As concern about pandemic influenza in the United
States grew in recent years, school closings increasingly
were seen as a means of “social distancing” capable of
slowing the spread of disease through the population
[1]. Thus, when novel influenza H1N1 emerged sud-
d e n l yi n2 0 0 9 ,i tw a sn o ts u r p r i s i n gt h a to v e r7 2 6K - 1 2
schools in the United States closed, affecting 368,282
students [2,3]. However, school closure can cause lost
instruction time and substantial economic losses for
both families and educational facilities [4], as well as
community upheaval. Because the decision to close
schools is rife with challenges, clarifying and considering
how to balance the multiple goals and objectives prior
to a disease outbreak is an important component of
public health emergency preparedness.
During the 2009 H1N1 outbreak in the United States
there appeared to be extensive variation across the coun-
try in decisions made about school closures. As a result,
decisions often appeared inconsistent, contributing to a
sense that the government did not know how to respond,
and perhaps was ineffective in meeting public health
goals. In the systems improvement perspective, excess
variation in health system structures and processes is a
cause for concern, indicating possible inefficiencies and
opportunities to improve the system [5,6]. Adopting this
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any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.perspective, the goal of this paper is to identify the critical
issues that arose during the Spring 2009 H1N1 outbreak,
analyze sources of variation, and identify lessons learned
to assist school districts and public health systems to
improve their school closure decision-making process.
In particular, we describe three key issues that chal-
lenged decision-makers during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak:
1) clarifying goals, 2) clarifying authority and the deci-
sion-making process, and 3) dealing with uncertainty in
preparing and issuing official guidance. Although we
refer to a number of specific decisions that were made,
our purpose is not to critique those decisions per se but
rather to use them to identify problems that are likely
to arise in future pandemics and other public health
emergencies and learn from them to improve public
health systems’ capabilities. Similarly, we do not pre-
sume to say what school closing policies should be, but
rather focus on the lessons learned from the 2009
experience to strengthen public health systems’ response
to future events.
Methods
Many aspects of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak were well
described in the media, on the Internet, and in scientific
publications, so we have based this analysis primarily on
monitoring key sources and Lexis-Nexis news and Inter-
net searches. In particular, we identified media reports
via Google alerts and Lexis-Nexis’ database of all major
newspapers in the United States using the search terms
“swine flu,”“ H1N1,” and “school closure” (as well as
appropriate truncated and extended variations of these
search terms). We included local and national media
sources in the analysis, and we accepted overlapping
stories in multiple sources in order to gain a full picture
of events taking place. As appropriate, additional media
reports were actively sought to better understand the
context for particular localities’ decisions. The purpose
of the searches was not to systematically quantify each
issue that was identified but, rather, to identify the
scope of issues that arose and decisions that were made,
so we stopped searching when new issues were no
longer appearing. Our focus was on events during the
Spring, but we consider some distinctions with the Fall
in the discussion below.
At least two members of the research team read each
media report and noted key issues that arose. In addi-
tion, we observed conference calls and meetings
between health departments and school officials in the
Boston and Washington, DC metropolitan areas, and we
held informal interviews with decision-makers and
community members as feasible. Many interviews were
conducted ad hoc during flu clinics or meetings, as deci-
sion-makers did not have time for extensive formal
interviews.
We organized the data collected from media reports
and interviews into major themes, which we then vetted
with public health researchers, practitioners, and educa-
tion officials to ensure we captured the key issues and
did not exclude any obvious concerns. While these
methods cannot tell us the frequency with which speci-
fic issues arose, we are confident that we have identified
and developed at least a basic understanding of the key
public health issues.
Results
Timing and extent of school closings
School closures during the pandemic’sf i r s tw a v e
occurred in several rough phases. Initially, schools were
closed on a somewhat ad hoc basis. After CDC issued
preliminary guidance on April 26, schools with 2009
H1N1 cases generally closed for at least seven days. On
May 1, CDC changed its guidance to suggest 14 days of
closure, and most schools with cases closed with the
intent to remain shuttered for 14 days. However, CDC
guidance changed again on May 5 to say that closure
was generally not necessary. After May 5, most schools
did not close after a case was identified, with the notable
exception of the New York City school system, which
continued closing schools to protect particularly vulner-
able children into June. A timeline of major school clo-
sure events is provided in Table 1.
Rationale for school closure
Three different rationales for closing schools during a
public health emergency emerged in the 2009 H1N1
outbreak: (1) limiting spread of the virus in the commu-
nity, (2) protecting vulnerable children, and (3) reacting
to staff shortages or children kept at home because of
infection or parents’ fears of infection.
In the United States as in Europe [15], the most com-
mon rationale for school closure was to limit spread of
the H1N1 virus in the community. This is based on the
idea that schools provide an ideal context for spread of
infectious diseases because children are more susceptible
to infection, less likely to adopt behavioral changes that
reduce disease spread, and more likely to sustain per-
son-to-person contact for lengthy periods. Closing
schools, therefore, may limit spread among children as
well as to their families and the general community, and
can be an important component of a community’s
“social distancing” efforts [16]. Reducing community
transmission might have the effect of reducing cumula-
tive incidence in a community, but, more likely, would
spread the epidemic curve in a community, slowing the
accumulation of cases while alternative control measures
are employed and reducing peak incidence to a level
more manageable by the health care system [17]. Clos-
ing schools was an important component of Mexico’s
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2009 H1N1 [18]. U.S. school administrators and public
health officials typically justified the costs of school clo-
sure on these grounds [19-21].
Evidence of the impact of school closure on the
spread of influenza, however, is limited and mixed. His-
torical analyses and epidemiologic modeling studies for
influenza and other respiratory diseases suggest that
social distancing measures, especially if implemented
early in an outbreak and sustained, can substantially
reduce both the total number of cases and the peak
attack rate [22-26]. On the other hand, a recent sys-
tematic review found only 19 studies with primary
empirical data on the impact of school closure per se,
many of which had significant methodological chal-
lenges [27]. Some mathematical models suggest that
school closure has a limited impact on cumulative case
counts, since children not attending school are free to
transmit infection to their families and others in the
community [28]. Other modeling studies suggest com-
bining school closure with sequestering children in the
home may curb pandemic spread and peak incidence
[29]. Differences are largely attributable to assumptions
underlying the models, reflecting uncertainties about
epidemiology and behavior that may be better under-
stood as more data become available. At minimum,
though, it is clear that closure’s effectiveness is reduced
if students congregate in large number in other settings,
and this proved to be a challenge in 2009 [30]. It also
appears, based on modeling studies, that significant
reductions in cumulative incidence may require
extended periods of closure (with eight to sixteen weeks
resulting in the greatest reductions in peak incidence)
[31]. We did not identify any school that closed for this
long, except in Hong Kong, where schools were closed
and not reopened before summer break, with a
reduction in cases occurring simultaneously [32]. This is
the only epidemiological analysis of which we are aware
to suggest that school closings actually had the effect of
limiting spread of H1N1 in 2009.
Although advocated as a social distancing measure
that imposes less societal costs than workplace closures
or public disruptions, it became evident during the
Spring 2009 H1N1 pandemic wave that school closures
imposed substantial costs in some instances. Parents
complained of the difficulty of finding child care or the
financial costs associated with finding someone to take
care of their children or staying home [33]. New York
City officials originally based their decision to close
schools one-at-a-time on the need to balance public
health interests “with the child-care and educational
needs of families” [34]. These officials noted, however,
that closures were compromised as a control measure if
“the kids don’t go to school and instead go to the shop-
ping mall or go to the park” [35] as library officials in
Queens reported a large number of children congregat-
ing after their schools were closed [36].
Indeed, formal studies of students in Boston and Pitts-
burgh have documented this behavior. High school stu-
dents in the Winsor School, a private girls’ school in
Boston that closed from May 20-26 following a sudden
increase in absenteeism, reported the average number of
days during this period on which they participated in
the following activities: shopping 1.47 days, visiting a
friend 2.21 days, using public transport 1.89 days, eating
out 2.44 days, and outdoor activities 3.42 days [37]. Dur-
ing a one-week closure of an elementary school in
southwestern Pennsylvania that closed during this per-
iod, 69% of students report having visited at least one
location outside their home [38]. These findings are
consistent with pre-pandemic findings about student
behavior during closures for seasonal influenza [39].
Table 1 Timeline of school closures
April 23, 2009 - The first suspected 2009 H1N1 cases in a school in the United States are identified at St. Francis Preparatory School in New York City.
Eight confirmed cases were reported on April 26 [7].
April 24, 2009 - All schools in Mexico City–serving about seven million students–are closed as a social distancing measure to slow the spread of
2009 H1N1 [8].
April 25, 2009 - Byron Steele High School in Cibolo, Texas, is the first school in the United States closed because of 2009 H1N1. The following day,
all schools in Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City Independent School District are closed by the Texas Department of State Health Services [9].
April 26, 2009 - School officials close St. Francis Preparatory School to disinfect the school. The same day, CDC recommends closing schools for
seven days when a case is identified [10].
May 1, 2009 - The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends that schools close for up to 14 days if a case of 2009 H1N1 is
identified [11].
May 5, 2009 - CDC changes its guidance to recommend that schools generally do not need to close and should, instead, keep ill children home for
at least seven days [12].
June 2, 2009 - New York City closes its final school in response to 2009 H1N1. New York continued school closures well after CDC ceased
recommending closure, with the justification that closure would protect particularly vulnerable students from within-school transmission [13].
August 7, 2009 - CDC recommends against school closures in most cases, instead recommending that ill children remain at home, as part of its
comprehensive guidance for schools to use during the Fall semester [14].
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experienced a higher attack rate than other age groups
and an unusually high rate of complications from the
2009 H1N1 virus [40], protecting children, especially
those who may be particularly vulnerable to complica-
tions, became a second rationale for school closure dur-
ing the 2009 outbreak. In New York City, where officials
continued closing schools even after CDC stopped
recommending it, Mayor Michael Bloomberg eventually
clarified that school closure would not slow transmis-
sion and that closure “has absolutely nothing to do with
the spread of the disease.” Rather, the justification for
closures shifted to preventing secondary cases among
particularly vulnerable school contacts [41].
The third rationale was purely practical: staff
shortages, whether due to actual illness or concerns
about infection or children kept at home because par-
ents feared they would become infected simply made it
impossible to keep schools open. We did not observe
this rationale in the Spring 2009 H1N1 outbreak, how-
ever closure due to very high absenteeism became com-
mon in the Fall resurgence. For example, several
Connecticut schools closed in October because of high
student absenteeism. “You can’t teach with one- to two-
thirds of the class absent,” explained the superintendant
of a district with closed schools [42]. In the last week of
October 2009, about 350 schools were closed nation-
wide, a high proportion of which appeared to be in
response to high absenteeism [43].
Triggers for school closings
Modeling studies consistently show that, to be effective,
school closure to limit community-wide transmission
requires an early trigger, such as before 1-2% of the
population is infected [44,45]. These results reflect the
assumption that influenza transmission can occur before
patients develop symptoms or in the presence of mild
symptoms, so there can be a substantial number of
infections before a sizable number are identified. Detec-
tion of a novel strain usually occurs after it is well-
established in a locale, so the community-wide benefit
of school closures is likely substantially diminished at
that point [46]. Unless closure is very fast following the
first identified cases or case detection is very efficient, it
may be difficult for schools to close in time to be maxi-
mally effective. Indeed, in 2009 transmission was often
not identified in a locale until clusters had already been
detected in schools [47].
For epidemiological purposes H1N1 cases are defined
(with ascending degrees of certainty) as “suspected,”
“probable,” or “laboratory confirmed” and the initial
2009 H1N1 case definitions emphasized contact with
other known cases [48]. In particular, a suspected case,
based on symptoms, became a probable case if there
were other cases in a child’s school. As such, these defi-
nitions created a degree of circularity, since suspected
cases in a school were sometime enough to make others
into probable cases.
Most U.S. schools did not close in the Spring until the
surfacing of a probable case or until higher than normal
rates of influenza-like-illness were observed at the
school [49,50]. In New York City, a private high school
with students who had recently returned from Mexico
became an early focal point for infections, and was
closed shortly after cases were confirmed, but after at
least eight children were ill. In Texas, however, the Fort
Worth school district closed all 144 schools after one
confirmed and three others suspected school-aged cases
were reported [51]. In Montgomery County, Maryland,
school officials closed a public high school after a single
probable case was identified. At the same time, other
Maryland schools with probable cases remained open
after consulting local health officials, though this deci-
sion appears to have been driven by the belief that
transmission within the schools had not occurred and
secondary cases were unlikely [52].
We did not observe schools adopting formal thresh-
olds for closure (for example a certain percentage of
students identified as ill or absent), although these were
used in Japan in Spring 2009 [53].
Authority and decision-making process for school
closures
Much of the variation in school closure decisions in
2009 was due to differences from one jurisdiction to
another in whom the legal and practical authority for
making decisions was vested. Depending on the jurisdic-
tion, the legal authority to close schools in response to a
public health threat may rest with school or health offi-
cials, at the state or local level. Additionally, in some
jurisdictions, closure authority changes if an emergency
has been declared, potentially in different ways depend-
ing on the form of the declared emergency [54]. Many
states include school closure measures in their pandemic
plans [55,56], but the plans are often vague about who
has the authority to make the decision. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that there was substantial variation in
decisions to close schools during April and May 2009
and conflict between authorities in some jurisdictions.
In Cibolo, Texas, the first American jurisdiction to
close schools, the decision was made by state health offi-
cials [57]. In Fort Worth, Texas, on the other hand,
local school officials made the decision to close schools
district-wide, on the basis of advice from the local
health department [58]. In Montgomery County, Mary-
land, shortly after health officials decided to close
schools, the School Superintendent protested the deci-
sion in a memo to the county school board stating, “We
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lack of compelling evidence for continued closure pro-
vided to us by state and county health officials” [59].
In New York City, public schools were closed by the
city Schools Chancellor in consultation with the New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
[60]. In addition, the local Roman Catholic archdiocese
independently closed some schools on suspicion of 2009
H1N1 cases [61]. It is unclear whether city officials had
the authority to order private schools closed, but they
did recommend closure [62].
In some instances, public health and school officials
faced contradictory concerns. One frequent issue that
arose dealt with laws mandating the number of instruc-
tion days schools must provide to receive state funding.
In several states, schools that closed for public health
purposes risked losing state education funding or incur-
ring significant costs by extending the school year. Dif-
ferent states responded to this issue in different ways.
Rhode Island law authorizes the state’s education com-
missioner to issue waivers of the instruction days
requirement for schools closed due to emergencies, and
such waivers were granted to schools closed for 2009
H1N1 [63]. New York law authorized waivers for
schools closed due to weather and other disruptions but
not epidemics [64]. The state legislature responded by
passing a law authorizing a waiver similar to that in
Rhode Island [65]. Tennessee’s legislature passed a simi-
lar bill [66]. Connecticut law authorized a waiver for
“extreme circumstances” which the state education com-
missioner did not include closures for influenza, and the
state legislature did not enact a proposed statutory
exemption. Closed Connecticut schools had to resche-
dule classes to meet for 180 days [67]. State education
officials in Alabama similarly indicated that any school
closed for influenza would lose a portion of its state
funding if it did not reschedule enough classes to meet
the minimum number of instruction days [68].
Official Guidance
Early in the Spring outbreak, state and local health
departments followed CDC guidance that districts “con-
sider adopting school dismissal.” This guidance largely
was influenced by early reports suggesting a high case-
fatality rate from 2009 H1N1 and that youth may be at
greater than average risk. CDC’s initial guidance also
suggested that schools with cases stay closed for 14 days
[69], reflecting concerns about the risks of reopening
while disease was still being transmitted. Such “gui-
dance,” often transmitted through state and local health
departments, carries substantial weight in local decision-
making. In part because state and local officials do not
have the same epidemiological knowledge as CDC, gui-
dance is often regarded as a recommendation.
CDC subsequently revised its guidance, announcing
that schools closed under the prior guidance could
reopen, but included the caveat that “decisions about
school closure should be at the discretion of local
authorities based on special circumstances and local
considerations, including public concern and the impact
of school absenteeism and staffing shortages” [70].
When additional data showed that the novel 2009
H1N1 was not especially severe, CDC changed its
recommendation to keeping ill children at home [71].
Some schools, however, continued closing “to be on the
safe side” [72].
Officials were often frustrated by frequent changes in
the CDC guidance. For example, shortly after CDC
increased its closure recommendation from 7 to 14
days, a Fort Worth, Texas, official stated, “The CDC is
changing its plans and guidance on a daily basis” [73].
However, especially at the beginning of a disease out-
break, knowledge about disease severity, transmissibility,
and the extent to which people with various underling
conditions are at increased risk of complications is
necessarily based on limited data. It should not be sur-
prising for this information and the resulting guidance
to be revised as more cases accumulate. Indeed in
CDC’s August 2009 school closure guidance, the agency
notes that while it did not currently recommend closure,
this could change if the disease’s severity increased [74].
CDC’s August 2009 school closure guidance suggests
that local authorities make school closure decisions by
balancing “the risks of keeping the students in school
with the social disruption that school dismissal can
cause” [75]. The guidance notes that “the potential ben-
efits of preemptively dismissing students from school
are often outweighed by negative consequences,” but
also that “school dismissals may be warranted, depend-
ing on the disease burden and other conditions.” Recog-
nizing that the severity may change, CDC has alternate
guidance to be followed in the event of more serious
disease [76].
Discussion
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) describes a “public
health system” as “a complex network of individuals and
organizations that have the potential to play critical
roles in creating the conditions for health” [77]. In the
context of emergency preparedness, this includes “com-
munities, health-care delivery systems, employers and
business, the media, homeland security and public
safety, academia, and the governmental public health
infrastructure” [78]. The emergence of the novel H1N1
influenza in 2009 clearly showed unnecessary variation
in the way that school closings were handled, suggesting
problems in the public health system that must be
addressed.
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tems improvement (SI) approach [79,80], seeking to
identify and reduce excess variability in processes and
outcomes while preserving system differences in goals,
context, and values that are critical to the specific envir-
onment [81]. Beyond this, excess variability is an indica-
tion suggests an opportunity for system improvement.
This approach explicitly views a system’s activities as
defined processes, that is, chains of events that produce
specific outcomes; focuses on changes that allow com-
plex, intertwined systems of people and information to
work more effectively; makes changes based on their
effects on measurable outcomes; and encourages contin-
uous improvement rather than onetime initiatives. SI
efforts employ specific activities such as learning colla-
boratives, process analysis, and critical event or failure
mode analysis. From this perspective, our analysis of
school closings is an example of learning from a critical
event about the nature and causes of variation in impor-
tant aspects of the public health system’s performance.
While CDC does not currently recommend large-scale
school closure, questions about whether, when, and how
to do so are likely to arise in the future, whether for 2009
H1N1 or some other pathogen. Because closure decisions
require local public health concerns to be balanced with
broader societal concerns, public health and school offi-
cials should consider the challenges inherent in closure
and develop realistic plans to address them. Our analysis
of the events of 2009 suggests three issues that require
attention. First, as an outbreak develops, the goals of
school closing should be clarified and specific measures
adapted to the goals. Second, as part of planning and pre-
paredness efforts, the legal and practical authority to
close schools should be clarified. Finally, decision-makers
should expect uncertainty and act accordingly.
Clarifying goals and forms of school closing
As indicated above, three different and conflicting ratio-
nales for closing schools emerged in the 2009 H1N1
outbreak: (1) limiting spread of the virus in the commu-
nity, (2) protecting vulnerable children, and (3) reacting
to staff shortages or children kept at home because par-
ents feared they would become infected. The rationale
matters because it drives considerations such as whether
to close schools at all, the nature and extent of closure,
and the triggers for closure and re-opening. For exam-
ple, because modeling data suggest that closure of one
month or longer may be necessary to substantially
reduce community transmission, closure for that pur-
p o s em i g h th a v et ob em u c hl o n g e r( a n de n t a i lm o r e
costs) than closure for other purposes [82]. Additionally,
closure decisions require effective balancing of potential
benefits and consequences, and this cannot be done
without a clear idea of what benefits are desired.
Current CDC guidance recognizes the potential costs
and difficulties of closure, calling for a careful balancing
between potential benefits from closure and the poten-
tial “negative consequences, including students being
left home alone, health workers missing shifts when
they must stay home with their children, students miss-
ing meals, and interruption of students’ education” [83].
While many parents and students will not find closure
to be a significant hardship [84], officials considering
closure must weigh not only the total amount of disrup-
tion but also the extent to which social costs will be dis-
proportionately borne by certain segments of society,
such as those who depend on school lunches to meet
nutritional needs. Closure, if adopted, should be neces-
sary to achieving goals which cannot effectively be
achieved through lesser alternatives, such as requiring ill
students to stay home or granting liberal absences. It is
unclear to what extent school and health officials
balanced hardships from closure against health protec-
tion, but such balancing played a role in CDC’s decision
to stop advising that schools close when it determined
that A/H1N1 was less dangerous than initial reports
suggested.
School closure can take a variety of forms [85]. One
end of the spectrum is full closure: neither educational
nor administrative functions continue and school per-
sonnel do not arrive for work. Alternatively, classes can
be dismissed, but some or all administrative functions
may continue in partial closures. Partial closures may
also allow schools to continue providing meals or other
social services during the period of class dismissal [86],
and continue to hold social events such as proms, and
academic gatherings such as SAT or ACT testing ser-
vices. However, partial closure that allows students to
congregate may defeat its purpose. During the Spring of
2009, it appears that the great majority of closures were
full and conducted preemptively.
There are a variety of alternatives to closure that
schools might consider. One of these is currently
endorsed by CDC for most instances: requiring ill stu-
dents to remain home in order to avoid infecting others
[87]. Additionally, schools could reduce the likelihood
that children with underlying conditions predisposing
them to complications of 2009 H1N1 will be exposed by
authorizing a liberal absencep o l i c yf o rt h o s es t u d e n t s .
A school which considering whether to close to amelio-
rate public fears might relax attendance requirements
for all students instead.
However, because public schools are funded based on
student attendance levels, some schools may choose to
close during times of high absenteeism in order to make
classes up later in the year. Alternatively, they could
attempt to overcome concerns about students missing
class material by instituting online teaching, which at
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U.S. Department of Education has suggested a variety of
off-site continuity of instruction tools including the use
of electronic media to teach children who are at home
[89], although it is unclear how many teachers are pre-
pared for distance teaching.
If the goal is to protect particularly vulnerable students,
schools may wish to defer to parents’ decisions about the
costs and benefits of a vulnerable student missing school,
and allow parents broader license to consult medical pro-
fessionals and preemptively keep their children home.
Other officials may pref e rab l u n t e ro p t i o n –such as clo-
sure–on the grounds that parents may lack information
to weigh risks and benefits. In addition, closing schools
later in an outbreak may still serve to protect vulnerable
children and staff from complications if within-school
intensity of transmission is high.
Clarifying legal authority for school closure
As described above, school closing decisions in 2009
were often inconsistent between neighboring jurisdic-
tions and over time. This may have contributed to a
sense that the government did not know how to
respond, and perhaps was ineffective in meeting public
health goals. Similar problems were seen during the
1918-19 pandemic when, as Stern and colleagues report,
“ill-defined lines of authority among governmental
branches contributed to the eruption of interagency
conflict in U.S. cities ... [and] confusion about authority
and jurisdiction helped lead to distrust in health officials
and political leaders.” The 2009 as well as the 1918-19
experiences suggests that, at the very least, officials must
consider in advance who has the authority to close
schools and identify what goals they wish to accomplish
through a potential closure.
Inconsistencies of this sort can be particularly obvious
in a region such as the Washington DC metropolitan
area, which includes two states as well as the District of
Columbia, plus numerous local jurisdictions, but one
media market. In such settings, and even in isolated jur-
isdictions, it seems important to be sure that reasons for
differences in decisions be clearly communicated to the
public.
Regardless of who has the formal authority to close
schools in a jurisdiction, the 2009 experience shows that
it is helpful to solicit input from a range of stakeholders
such as local and state health and school officials as well
as students, their parents, and school staff. Broader
inclusion of stakeholders both improves the likelihood
that decisions are made with full information and pro-
mote consideration of benefits and costs that will accrue
to different affected groups. Coordination of this sort
also helps to ensure the credibility of the message [90].
The New York school closures described above, for
instance, conveyed a sense of a unified city government
decision, announced jointly by the top-ranking school
and health officials, and press announcements also fre-
quently included Mayor Michael Bloomberg.
Expect uncertainty
Decisions about whether and how to close schools logi-
cally depend on epidemiological information about who
is likely to be infected, the severity of illness in those
infected, and periods of infectiousness. Infectious disease
outbreaks, however, are often characterized by scientific
uncertainty [91], and the 2009 H1N1 outbreak was no
different. Changing and variable case definitions led to
uncertain understanding of the epidemiological risks,
which in turn led to frequent changes in official gui-
dance. This uncertainty made all of the decisions
regarding school closing more difficult. In particular,
information emerged during the Spring to suggest that,
2009 H1N1 infection less severe than most pandemic
planning assumptions, and children were more likely to
be infected and suffer severe consequences. Each of
these factors influenced decisions about whether and
how to close schools.
If the 2009 H1N1 pandemic is any guide to the future,
public health and other officials should expect and plan
for uncertainty about the facts and frequent changes in
official guidance that is based on a constantly evolving
epidemiologic knowledge base. This begins with
acknowledging the uncertainty and requires flexibility in
policies and procedures such as consideration of varia-
tions of school closing and alternatives as discussed
above. During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, for instance,
the goal of the acting CDC Director Richard Bessor was
to “tell everything we knew, everything we didn’t know,
and what we were doing to get the answers” [92].
In particular, because H1N1 has and will likely con-
tinue to affect communities differentially; both socially
and epidemiologically, monitoring the situation at the
local level will play an important role in closure deci-
sions. Communities will experience varying levels of
transmission, and some populations have more people
who are highly susceptible to complications than others.
Wealthier communities may be able to keep schools
closed as parents have childcare alternatives, while com-
munities with more disadvantaged populations may
depend on schools for a variety of resources such as
childcare and school lunches. The 2009 experience sug-
gests that local school and health officials must monitor
the situation in their communities and work together
closely to integrate local information with state and fed-
eral guidance.
Planning for uncertainty includes development of sys-
tems to track the epidemic and its consequences as well
as evaluate the impact of control efforts, that is, to
Klaiman et al. BMC Public Health 2011, 11:73
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/73
Page 7 of 10provide “situational awareness.” It also requires a degree
of humility in presenting decisions to both senior policy
makers and the public, clearly stating the basis on which
decisions were made and noting the likelihood that they
can, or are likely to, change.
Conclusion
A careful analysis of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak finds
extensive variation across the United States in expressed
rationales, decision triggers, and decision-making
authority for school closures. This led to decisions
which were often inconsistent from one locale to
another and over time, contributing to a sense that the
government was unsure how to respond and perhaps
ineffective. From a systems improvement perspective,
however, such excess variation in is a cause for concern,
indicating possible inefficiencies and opportunities to
improve the system.
Because school closure decisions require local public
health concerns to be balanced with broader societal
concerns, analysis of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic suggests
three issues public health and school officials should
consider in planning for and making school closure
decisions in the future. First, the goal of school closing
should be made clear and specific measures should be
tailored to the goal and modified over time as evolving
knowledge requires. Second, legal and practical authority
to close schools should be clarified in advance, as part
of planning and preparedness efforts. Finally, decision-
makers should expect uncertainty and maintain situa-
tional awareness, be flexible in policies and procedures,
and act with humility.
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